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Abstract—Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium,
wireless communication is extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping
attack. Physical-layer security is emerging as a new paradigm
to prevent the eavesdropper from interception by exploiting the
physical characteristics of wireless channels, which has recently
attracted a lot of research attentions. In this paper, we consider
the physical-layer security in cooperative wireless networks with
multiple decode-and-forward (DF) relays and investigate the
best relay selection in the presence of eavesdropping attack.
For the comparison purpose, we also examine the conventional
direct transmission without relay and traditional max-min relay
selection. We derive closed-form intercept probability expressions
of the direct transmission, traditional max-min relay selection,
and proposed best relay selection schemes in Rayleigh fading
channels. Numerical results show that the proposed best re-
lay selection scheme strictly outperforms the traditional direct
transmission and max-min relay selection schemes in terms
of intercept probability. In addition, as the number of relays
increases, the intercept probabilities of both traditional max-min
relay selection and proposed best relay selection schemes decrease
significantly, showing the advantage of exploiting multiple relays
against eavesdropping attack.
Index Terms—Intercept probability, best relay selection, eaves-
dropping attack, physical-layer security, cooperative wireless
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks, radio signals can be overheard by
unauthorized users due to the broadcast nature of wireless
medium, which makes the wireless communication systems
vulnerable to eavesdropping attack. Secret key encryption
techniques have been widely used to prevent eavesdropping
and ensure the confidentiality of signal transmissions. How-
ever, the cryptographic techniques rely on secret keys and
introduce additional complexities due to the dynamic distri-
bution and management of secret keys. To this end, physical-
layer security is emerging as an alternative paradigm to prevent
the eavesdropper attack and assure the secure communication
by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels.
The physical-layer security work was pioneered by Wyner [1]
and further extended in [2], where an information-theoretic
framework has been established by developing achievable
secrecy rates. It has been proven in [2] that in the presence
of an eavesdropper, a so-called secrecy capacity is shown
as the difference between the channel capacity from source
to destination (called main link) and that from source to
eavesdropper (called wiretap link). If the secrecy capacity is
negative, the eavesdropper can intercept the transmission from
source to destination and an intercept event occurs in this
case. Due to the wireless fading effect, the secrecy capacity is
severely limited, which results in an increase in the intercept
probability. To alleviate this problem, some existing work is
proposed to improve the secrecy capacity by taking advantage
of multiple antennas [3] and [4].
However, it may be difficult to implement multiple antennas
in some cases (e.g., handheld terminals, sensor nodes, etc.)
due to the limitation in physical size and power consumption.
As an alternative, user cooperation is proposed as an effective
means to combat wireless fading, which also has great poten-
tial to improve the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions
in the presence of eavesdropping attack. In [5], the authors
studied the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions in
the presence of an eavesdropper with a relay node, where
the amplify-and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), and
compress-and-forward (CF) relaying protocols are examined
and compared with each other. The cooperative jamming was
proposed in [6] by allowing multiple users to cooperate with
each other in preventing eavesdropping and analyzed in terms
of the achievable secrecy rate. In [7], the cooperation strategy
was further examined to enhance the physical-layer security
and a so-called noise-forwarding scheme was proposed, where
the relay node attempts to send codewords independent of
the source message to confuse the eavesdropper. In addition,
in [8] and [9], the authors explored the cooperative relays
for physical-layer security improvement and developed the
corresponding secrecy capacity performance, showing that
the cooperative relays can significantly increase the secrecy
capacity.
In this paper, we consider a cooperative wireless network
with multiple DF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper and
examine the best relay selection to improve wireless security
against eavesdropping attack. Differing from the traditional
max-min relay selection criterion in [10] where only the
channel state information (CSI) of two-hop relay links (i.e.,
source-relay and relay-destination) are considered, we here
have to take into account additional CSI of the eavesdropper’s
links, in addition to the two-hop relay links’ CSI. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First,
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Fig. 1. A cooperative wireless network consisting of multiple decode-and-
forward (DF) relays in the presence of an eavesdropper.
we propose the best relay selection scheme in a cooperative
wireless networks with multiple DF relays in the presence of
eavesdropping attack. We also examine the direct transmission
without relay and traditional max-min relay selection as bench-
mark schemes. Secondly, we derive closed-form expressions
of intercept probability for the direct transmission, traditional
max-min relay selection, and proposed best relay selection
schemes in Rayleigh fading channels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model and describes the direct transmis-
sion, traditional max-min relay selection, and proposed best
relay selection schemes. In Section III, we derive closed-form
intercept probability expressions of the direct transmission,
traditional max-min relay selection, and proposed best relay
selection schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. In Section
IV, we conduct numerical intercept probability evaluation to
show the advantage of proposed best relay selection over
traditional max-min relay selection. Finally, we make some
concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED BEST RELAY
SELECTION SCHEME
A. System Model
Consider a cooperative wireless network consisting of one
source, one destination, and M DF relays in the presence of an
eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are equipped
with single antenna and the solid and dash lines represent the
main and wiretap links, respectively. The main and wiretap
links both are modeled as Rayleigh fading channels and the
thermal noise received at any node is modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ2n,
i.e., CN (0, σ2n). Following [8], we consider that M relays are
exploited to assist the transmission from source to destination
and the direct links from source to destination and eavesdrop-
per are not available, e.g., the destination and eavesdropper
both are out of the coverage area. For notational convenience,
M relays are denoted by R = {Ri|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M}. Differ-
ing from the existing work [8] in which all relays participate
in forwarding the source messages to destination, we here
consider the use of the best relay only to forward the message
transmission from source to destination. More specifically, the
source node first broadcasts the message to cooperative relays
among which only the best relay will be selected to forward
its received signal to destination. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper
monitors the transmission from the best relay to destination
and attempts to interpret the source message. Following [8],
we assume that the eavesdropper knows everything about
the signal transmission from source via relay to destination,
including the encoding scheme at source, forwarding protocol
at relays, and decoding method at destination, except that the
source signal is confidential.
It needs to be pointed out that in order to effectively prevent
the eavesdropper from interception, not only the CSI of main
links, but also the wiretap links’ CSI should be considered in
the best relay selection. This differs from the traditional relay
selection in [10] where only the two-hop relay links’ CSI is
considered in performing relay selection. Similarly to [8], we
here assume that the global CSI of both main and wiretap links
are available, which is a common assumption in the physical-
layer security literature. Notice that the wiretaps link’s CSI can
be estimated and obtained by monitoring the eavesdropper’s
transmissions as discussed in [8]. In the following, we first
describe the conventional direct transmission without relay
and then present the traditional max-min relay selection and
proposed best relay selection schemes.
B. Direct Transmission
For comparison purpose, this subsection describes the con-
ventional direct transmission without relay. Consider that the
source transmits a signal s (E(|s|2) = 1) with power P . Thus,
the received signal at destination is expressed as
rd =
√
Phsds+ nd, (1)
where hsd represents a fading coefficient of the channel from
source to destination and nd ∼ CN (0, σ2n) represents additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at destination. Meanwhile,
due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, the
eavesdropper also receives a copy of the source signal s and
the corresponding received signal is written as
re =
√
Phses+ ne, (2)
where hse represents a fading coefficient of the channel
from source to eavesdropper and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2n) represents
AWGN at eavesdropper. Assuming the optimal Gaussian code-
book used at source, the maximal achievable rate (also known
as channel capacity) of the direct transmission from source to
destination is obtained from Eq. (1) as
Cdirectsd = log2(1 +
|hsd|2P
σ2n
), (3)
where σ2n is the noise variance. Similarly, from Eq. (2), the
capacity of wiretap link from source to eavesdropper is easily
given by
Cdirectse = log2(1 +
|hse|2P
σ2n
). (4)
It has been proven in [2] that the secrecy capacity is shown as
the difference between the capacity of main link and that of
wiretap link. Hence, the secrecy capacity of direct transmission
is given by
Cdirects = C
direct
sd − Cdirectse , (5)
where Cdirectsd and Cdirectse are given in Eqs. (3) and (4), re-
spectively. As discussed in [2], when the secrecy capacity is
negative (i.e., the capacity of main link falls below the wiretap
link’s capacity), the eavesdropper can intercept the source
signal and an intercept event occurs. Thus, the probability
that the eavesdropper successfully intercepts source signal,
called intercept probability, is a key metric in evaluating
the performance of physical-layer security. In this paper, we
mainly focus on how to improve the intercept probability by
exploiting the best relay selection to enhance the wireless secu-
rity against eavesdropping. The following subsection describes
the relay selection for physical-layer security in the presence
of eavesdropper attack.
C. Relay Selection
Considering the DF protocol, the relay first decodes its
received signal from source and then re-encodes and transmits
its decoded outcome to the destination. More specifically, the
source node first broadcasts the signal s to M relays that
attempt to decode their received signals. Then, only the best
relay is selected to re-encode and transmit its decoded outcome
to the destination. Notice that in the DF relaying transmission,
the source signal s is transmitted twice from the source and
relay, respectively. In order to make a fair comparison with
the direct transmission, the total amount of transmit power at
source and relay shall be limited to P . By using the equal-
power allocation for simplicity, the transmit power at source
and relay is given by P/2. In DF relaying transmission, either
source-relay or relay-destination links in failure will result
in the two-hop DF transmission in failure, implying that the
capacity of DF transmission is the minimum of the capacity
from source to relay and that from relay to destination. Hence,
considering Ri as the best relay, we can obtain the capacity
of DF relaying transmission from source via Ri to destination
as
CDFsid = min(Csi, Cid), (6)
where Csi and Cid, respectively, represent the channel capacity
from source to Ri and that from Ri to destination, which are
given by
Csi = log2(1 +
|hsi|2P
2σ2n
), (7)
and
Cid = log2(1 +
|hid|2P
2σ2n
). (8)
Meanwhile, the eavesdropper can overhear the transmission
from Ri to destination. Hence, the channel capacity from Ri
to eavesdropper can be easily obtained as
CDFie = log2(1 +
|hie|2P
2σ2n
). (9)
Combining Eqs. (6) and (9), the secrecy capacity of DF
relaying transmission with Ri is given by
CDFi =C
DF
sid − CDFie
=log2
(
1 +
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2)P
2σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
|hie|2P
2σ2n
)
.
(10)
The following presents the traditional max-min relay selection
and proposed best relay selection schemes.
1) Traditional Max-Min Relay Selection Scheme: Let us
first present the traditional max-min relay selection scheme
for the comparison purpose. In the traditional relay selection
scheme, the relay that maximizes the capacity of DF relaying
transmission CDFsid is viewed as the best relay. Thus, the
traditional relay selection criterion is obtained from Eq. (6)
as
BestRelay = argmax
i∈R
CDFsid
= argmax
i∈R
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2),
(11)
which is the traditional max-min relay selection criterion as
given by Eq. (1) in [10]. As shown in Eq. (11), only the main
links’ CSI |hsi|2 and |hid|2 is considered in the max-min relay
selection scheme without considering the eavesdropper’s CSI
|hie|2.
2) Proposed Best Relay Selection Scheme: We now propose
the best relay selection criterion considering the CSI of both
main and wiretap links, in which the relay that maximizes the
secrecy capacity of DF relaying transmission is selected as the
best relay. Thus, the best relay selection criterion is obtained
from Eq. (10) as
BestRelay = argmax
i∈R
CDFi
= argmax
i∈R
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2)P + 2σ2n
|hie|2P + 2σ2n
.
(12)
One can observe from Eq. (12) that the proposed best relay se-
lection scheme takes into account not only the main links’ CSI
|hsi|2 and |hid|2, but also the wiretap link’s CSI |hie|2. This
differs from the traditional max-min relay selection criterion in
Eq. (11) where only the main links’ CSI is considered. Notice
that the transmit power P in Eq. (12) is a known parameter
and the noise variance σ2n is shown as σ2n = κTB [12], where
κ is Boltzmann constant (i.e., κ = 1.38× 10−23), T is room
temperature, and B is system bandwidth. Since the room tem-
perature T and system bandwidth B both are predetermined,
the noise variance σ2n can be easily obtained. It is pointed
out that using the proposed best relay selection criterion in
Eq. (12), we can further develop a centralized or distributed
relay selection algorithm. To be specific, for a centralized
relay selection, the source node needs to maintain a table that
consists of M relays and related CSI (i.e., |hsi|2, |hid|2 and
|hie|2). In this way, the best relay can be easily determined by
looking up the table using the proposed criterion in Eq. (12),
which is referred to as centralized relay selection strategy. For
a distributed relay selection, each relay maintains a timer and
sets an initial value of the timer in inverse proportional to
min(|hsi|
2,|hid|
2)P+2σ2
n
|hie|2P+2σ2n
in Eq. (12), resulting in the best relay
with the smallest initial value for its timer. As a consequence,
the best relay exhausts its timer earliest compared with the
other relays, and then broadcasts a control packet to notify
the source node and other relays [11].
III. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive closed-form intercept probability
expressions of the direct transmission, traditional max-min
relay selection and proposed best relay selection schemes over
Rayleigh fading channels.
A. Direct Transmission
Let us first analyze the intercept probability of direct trans-
mission as a baseline for the comparison purpose. As is known,
an intercept event occurs when the secrecy capacity becomes
negative. Thus, the intercept probability of direct transmission
is obtained from Eq. (5) as
P directintercept = Pr
(
Cdirectsd < C
direct
se
)
= Pr
(|hsd|2 < |hse|2) ,
(13)
where the second equation is obtained by using Eqs. (3)
and (4). Considering that |hsd|2 and |hse|2 are independent
exponentially distributed, we obtain a closed-form intercept
probability expression of direct transmission as
P directintercept =
σ2se
σ2se + σ
2
sd
=
1
1 + λ−1de
· 1
λde
, (14)
where σ2se = E(|hse|2), σ2sd = E(|hsd|2), and λde = σ2sd/σ2se
is the ratio of average channel gain from source to destination
to that from source to eavesdropper, which is referred to as
the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) throughout this paper.
It is observed from Eq. (14) that the intercept probability of
direct transmission is independent of the transmit power P ,
which implies that the wireless security performance cannot
be improved by increasing the transmit power. This motivates
us to exploit cooperative relays to decrease the intercept
probability and improve the physical-layer security.
B. Traditional Max-Min Scheme
This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis of
traditional max-min scheme in Rayleigh fading channels. From
Eq. (11), we obtain an intercept probability of the traditional
max-min scheme as
P traditionalintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CDFsid < C
DF
be
)
, (15)
where CDFbe denotes the channel capacity from the best relay to
eavesdropper with DF relaying protocol. Similarly, assuming
that hsi and hid (i = 1, · · · ,M) are identically and indepen-
dently distributed and using the law of total probability, the
intercept probability of traditional max-min scheme is given
by
P traditionalintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
Pr
(
max
i∈R
min
(|hsi|2, |hid|2) < |hme|2
)
.
(16)
Notice that |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hme|2 follow exponential dis-
tributions with means σ2si, σ2id and σ2me, respectively. Letting
x = |hme|2, we obtain Eq. (17) at the top of the following
page, where the second equation is obtained by using the
binomial expansion, Ak represents the k-th non-empty sub-
collection of M relays, and |Ak| represents the number of
elements in set Ak.
C. Proposed Best Relay Selection Scheme
This subsection derives a closed-form intercept probabil-
ity expression of the proposed best relay selection scheme.
According to the definition of intercept event, an intercept
probability of proposed scheme is obtained from Eq. (12) as
P proposedintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CDFi < 0
)
=
M∏
i=1
Pr
{
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2) < |hie|2
}
,
(18)
where the second equation is obtained by using Eq. (10).
Notice that random variables |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hie|2 follow
exponential distributions with means σ2si, σ2id and σ2ie, respec-
tively. Denoting X = min(|hsi|2, |hid|2), we can easily obtain
the cumulative density function (CDF) of X as
PX(X < x) = 1− exp(− x
σ2si
− x
σ2id
), (19)
wherein x ≥ 0. Using Eq. (19), we have
P
proposed
intercept =
M∏
i=1
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
id
, (20)
which completes the closed-form intercept probability analysis
of OAS scheme in Rayleigh fading channels.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Fig. 2 shows the numerical intercept probability results
of direct transmission, traditional max-min relay selection,
and proposed best-relay selection schemes by plotting Eqs.
(14), (17) and (20) as a function of MER. One can see
from Fig. 2 that for both cases of M = 2 and M = 4,
the intercept probability of proposed best relay selection
scheme is always smaller than that of traditional max-min
relay selection, showing the advantage of proposed best relay
selection over traditional max-min scheme. Fig. 3 depicts
the intercept probability versus the number of relays M of
the traditional max-min and proposed best relay selection
schemes. It is observed from Fig. 3 that the proposed best relay
selection scheme strictly performs better than the traditional
max-min scheme in terms of the intercept probability. Fig.
3 also shows that as the number of relays M increases, the
P traditionalintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0
M∏
i=1
[1− exp(− x
σ2si
− x
σ2id
)]
1
σ2me
exp(− x
σ2me
)dx
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0

1 +
2M−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak| exp[−
∑
i∈Ak
(
x
σ2si
+
x
σ2id
)]

 1
σ2me
exp(− x
σ2me
)dx
=
M∑
m=1
1
M

1 +
2M−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|[1 +
∑
i∈Ak
(
σ2me
σ2si
+
σ2me
σ2id
)]−1


(17)
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intercept probabilities of both the traditional and proposed
relay selection schemes significantly decrease. This means
that increasing the number of relays can greatly improve the
physical-layer security against eavesdropping attack.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the physical-layer security in
cooperative wireless networks with multiple DF relays and
proposed the best relay selection scheme to improve wireless
security against eavesdropping attack. We also examined the
direct transmission and traditional max-min relay selection as
benchmark schemes. We derived closed-form intercept proba-
bility expressions of the direct transmission, traditional max-
min relay selection, and proposed best relay selection schemes.
Numerical intercept probability results showed that the pro-
posed best relay selection scheme always performs better than
the direct transmission and max-min relay selection schemes.
Moreover, as the number of relays increases, the max-min
relay selection and proposed best relay selection schemes both
significantly improve, which shows the advantage of exploiting
multiple relays for the physical-layer security improvement.
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